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Aircraft Overflights as a Fifth Amendment Taking: The Exten-
sion of Damages for the Loss of Potential Future Uses to
Avigation Easements.
Brown v. United States'
byScottP.Keifer -
. INTRODUCTION
As the United States entered
the Twentieth century, the rights of a
holder of real property were well settled
and best stated by the latin phrase cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum or
"he who owns the soil, owns it to the
heavens."' This theory of airspace
property ownership was originally a
product of Roman law before being later
accepted into English common law and
eventually carried across the Atlantic
and adopted in the United States. At
the turn of the century, this maxim had
withstood the test of time and was the
uncontested rule on airspace property
rights.' This well reasoned theory was
about to collapse.
On December 17, 1903, near
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, a successful
experiment by the Wright Brothers
ushered in the era of powered flight.s
That first flight, although lasting only
twelve seconds and travelling 120 feet,6
signaled the beginning of the age of
avigation, and the end for the traditional
concepts of property ownership.
Soon, for the first time in
history, people all over the country were
witnessing pilots, from barnstormers to
air mail carriers, traverse the sky. With
the aid of the airplane, people could now
travel across cities, counties, and even
states without touching the ground
below. While many looked up to the
sky and watched in awe, some property
owners did not react with such
admiration. For them, the pilots were
travelling over private property. These
flights, sometimes at near treetop level,
created loud, disturbing noise which
affected their families and farm animals.
Suddenly, one of the sticks in their
bundle of property rights, "the right of
ownership to the heavens,"' had been
snatched away.
In 1926, Congress passed the
Air Commerce Act' in an attempt to put
at rest the issues of ownership of the
airspace.9 In the Act, Congress claimed
exclusive sovereignty in the airspace
over the country.o The first U.S.
Supreme Court case to address the issue
involved Thomas Causby, a property
owner with land abutting a small airport
outside Greensboro, North Carolina."
In 1942, the United States government,
pursuant to the national emergency of
World War II, leased the airport adjacent
to Causby and began flying various
aircraft including transports, bombers,
and fighters from the airfield." The
aircraft flew at heights of less than 100
feet above Causby's property,
frequently coming within 67 feet of the
house and 18 feet of the trees." The
flights, both day and night, caused
significant disruption of the Causby's
peace and livelihood, including the
destruction of the property's use as a
commercial chicken farm as a result of a
drastic reduction in chicken production
and over 150 chickens killed from fright
and disorientation from the nearby
aircraft.' Causby filed an inverse
condemnation 5 lawsuit against the
federal government.'" His complaint
alleged the taking of an easement over
his property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution's prohibition against the
taking of private property for public use
without just compensation."
In 1946, the case made it to the
United States Supreme Court." In a
landmark decision, the Court found that
'73 F.3d I100 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
28 Am. Jur.2d 618,2 Blackstone Commentaries 18(1836). See also, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,260-261(1946), citing I Coke,
Institutes, 19th Ed. 1832, ch. 1, § 1(4a); 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, Lewis Ed. 1902, p. 18; 3 Kent, Commentaries, Gould Ed. 1896, p.
621.
3Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man's Land, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 157, 162-163 (1990).
41d. at 163.
-THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACrS 502 (1997).
6Id.
'See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
s49 U.S.C §171 et seq (repealed 1958).
'See infra notes 81 - 89 and accompanying text.
"See infra note 83 and accompanying text.




'BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 825 (6th ed. 1990) defines "inverse condemnation" as an action brought by a property owner seeking just
compensation for land taken for a public use, against a government or private entity having the power of eminent domain.
'
6Causby, 328 U.S. at 258.
'
7See U.S. CONST. amend. V., which states the following: "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
'"Causby, 328 U.S. 256.
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a taking had occurred and compensation
was due.'9 The Court held that a taking
of an "avigation easement"2o occurs
where the flights over private land are
so low and so frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land."
Through the next fifty years, the
Supreme Court and Court of Claims
elaborated and expanded upon the
holding of Causby."
In 1996, the Court of Claims
heard Brown v. United States", and
considered the issue of whether the
overflights must cause an impairment
of the immediate use of the property,
such as the chicken farming in Causby,
or whether the landowner can claim a
loss from potential future uses
precluded by the presence of the
overflights.24 The court held that the
landowner need not suffer a
diminishment of the present, actual use
of the property, but can claim a loss of
fair market value of other uses to which
the land could readily be converted.2 s
This decision expanded the concept of
avigation easement by allowing a
landowner without any current damages
to seek restitution for losses from the
inability to pursue land uses which have
been precluded by the aircraft
overflights.
This casenote will explore the
evolution of the concept of property
ownership and avigation easements
from the original common law theory,
through Causby and its progeny, to
Brown v. United States. In addition, this
casenote will provide a detailed analysis
of the impact of the Brown decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Browns own a 6,858 acre
ranch in West Texas." They built a
second home there, and use the ranch
for recreation and cattle ranching."
Additionally, the Browns charge guests
a fee to hunt on their property." The
Browns have indicated an intent to
further improve their land for
recreational use and eventually sell it in
a high priced market for recreational
properties. 9
Beginning in January, 1991, the
Air Force began using a small airfield,
Wizard Auxiliary Airfield, to train its
pilots." Wizard is located on property
which is adjacent to the Browns'
property."' Flights out of Laughlin Air
Force Base, about 25 miles northwest
of Wizard, conduct "touch and go"
exercises on the Wizard airstrip. 2 In a
touch and go exercise, a plane
approaches the landing strip as if to land,
touches the ground, and takes off again
without coming to a stop." Such
exercises require the planes to fly very
low, producing a great deal of noise on
the ground.34 On take off from Wizard's
airstrip, planes fly less than 500 feet
above ground level (AGL) over at least
100 acres of the Brown's property." The
touch and go maneuvers at Wizard are
conducted primarily on weekdays
during daylight hours.'
When the government
purchased the land on which the airstrip
was built, they also purchased an
easement over the land immediately
surrounding the airfield." The Browns'
property abuts land over which the Air
Force owns an easement.' In December,
1989, while Wizard was being built, the
Air Force solicited the sale of an
easement from the Browns." The
Browns refused the offer, but the Air
Force never initiated condemnation
proceedings.'
On February 7, 1992, the
'
91d,
"The Causby decision actually phrased the taking as an "easement of flight". 328 U.S. at 261. The concept later became known as an
"avigation easement." The phrase "avigation easement" is found throughout court opinions and legal writing that discuss the issue of the
taking of airspace by aviation overflights. The phrase distinguishes an easement as being through airspace and for aviation traffic, as
opposed to an airspace easement for buildings or a navigation easement through water. See Cahoon, supra note 3, 173 & n.95.
3
'Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
"See Cahoon, supra note 3, at 167-191. For a list of cases in various jurisdictions, see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Airport Operations or
Flight ofAircraft as Constituting Taking or Damaging of Property, 22 A.L.R. 4th 863 (1983). See also Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.
Cl. 187, 195-196 (1995).














"Brown v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 23, 25 (1993).






Browns filed their complaint in the Court
of Federal Claims, alleging a taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.4 ' The
Browns alleged that noise from low
overflights by Air Force planes
constituted a taking of their property,
and that just compensation was due. 2
The Browns sought $1,500,000 in
damages."
The Government moved for
summary judgment arguing that as a
matter of law the Browns could not
recover." In addition to opposing the
Government's motion for summary
judgment, the Browns argued that
undisputed evidence showed that the
Government had taken their property
and therefore the only issue was how
much the property taken was worth."
The Browns accordingly moved for
partial summary judgment in their
favor."
The Court of Federal Claims
granted the Government's motion for
summary judgment and consequently
denied the Browns' motion for partial
summary judgment.' The court held
that the Browns could not recover as a
matter of law, because although the
occurrence of frequent and low
overflights was undisputed, the Browns
had not shown substantial interference
with their present enjoyment and use of
the overflown surface property.' The
Browns appealed."
The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded.-" Stating that
a party may have a cause of action where
overflights substantially interfered with
the owners' enjoyment and use of the
property, the court remanded for a
determination of whether the Browns'
property had been taken, and if so, how
much compensation is due.' The court
directed the trial court to consider
potential future uses of the land now
precluded by the overflights.5 2 The
court stated that to the extent that
frequent and low overflights, through
noise, vibrations, and fumes, have
directly and substantially impaired the
Browns' use of their property for
recreational ranching or other uses "to
which the land could readily be
converted," there has been substantial
interference with their enjoyment and
compensation is due."
IIL LEGALBACKGROUND
A. Fifth Amendment Taking
The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the
taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. 4 The
Supreme Court has long held that any
permanent physical occupation is a
taking.55 Even if the government
invades only an easement in property,
the invasion nonetheless amounts to a
taking and compensation must be paid.'
Regardless of the extent of the intrusion,
the Court has "uniformly... found a
taking to the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or
has only minimal economic impact on
the owner.""
The Fifth Amendment
requires "just compensation" when a
private property holder's land is the
object of a taking.s' The Constitution
and statutes do not define this term.s'
The Supreme Court has recognized "just
compensation" as the value of the
interest taken, stating that the value "is
not the value to the owner for his
particular purposes or the condemnor
for some special use but a so-called
'market value.""' Under this standard,

















'See supra note 17.
"Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982). As early as 1872, the Court has invariably found a taking
anytime a claimant raised a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation. Id. at 427. See also Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. 166 (1872).
'Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
"Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-435.
"See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In addition, every state considers compensation a mandatory accompaniment to condemnation
actions. The United States Supreme Court, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84,90 (1962), has read a compensation requirement into
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lynda J. Oswald,Goodwill and Going Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just
Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REv. 283, 297 (1991).
'United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946).
mld. Although market value is the method chosen to "strike a balance between the public's need and the claimant's loss" upon
condemnation of property for a public purpose, the Supreme Court has refused to designate market value as the sole measure of just
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willing buyer would pay in cash to a
willing seller" at the time of the taking.'
The purpose of the "just
compensation" requirement is to make
the owner of the taken property whole
by putting him in the same pecuniary
position as he would have been had his
property not been taken.'2 While the
Fifth Amendment does not guarantee a
return on investment," the owner of the
taken property has long been permitted
to claim a property valuation at a value
for the "highest and best use"' of the
condemned property.' In Olson v.
United States,6 the Supreme Court
stated:
The sum required to be paid
the owner does not depend
upon the uses to which he has
devoted his land but is to be
arrived at upon just
consideration of all the uses
for which it is suitable. The
highest and most profitable
use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely
to be needed in the near future
is to be considered, not
necessarily as the measure of
value, but to the full extent that
the prospect of demand for
such use affects the market
value while the property is
privately held.6
In an effort to avoid gross speculation
as to the highest and best use of the
property, the Olson Court directs that
the offered "use" requires a showing of
reasonable probability that the land is
both physically adaptable for such use
and that there is a need or demand for
such use in the reasonably near future.'
Not all losses suffered by the
property owner are subject to
compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.' "[Tihe Sovereign must
pay only for what it takes, not for the
opportunities the owner may lose." 0
Consequential losses such as loss of
projected future profits, damage to
good-will, or the expense of relocation
are not permitted in federal
condemnation proceedings." In
General Motors,7 2 the Supreme Court
conceded that failing to take these
factors into consideration results in
inadequate compensation." Justice
Roberts wrote: "No doubt... if the owner
is to be made whole for the loss
consequent on the sovereign's seizure
of his property, these elements should
be properly considered." The Court,
however, refused to depart from the
traditional rule."
B. Federal Avigation Easements
In the area of aircraft
overflights, a fundamental issue is how
much of the airspace actually
constitutes private property.
Traditionally, common law held that
ownership extended to the periphery of
the universe." Early this century,
landowners invoked this theory to
maintain actions for a variety of property
compensation. There are situations where market value is inappropriate, such as when it is too difficult to find, or when its application
would result in manifest injustice to the property owner or public. If an award of market value would diverge so substantially from the
indemnity principle, a violation of the Fifth Amendment could result. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512-513
(1979).
11564.54 Acres ofLand, 441 U.S. at 511.
62 See Id. at 510-511; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
'United States v. 1735 N. Lynn St., 676 F. Supp. 693, 701 (D.C. Va., 1987).
'See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-256 (1934).
"The trial judge is granted authority to determine the highest and best use issue. In United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19 (1970), the
Supreme Court established that a "scope-of-the-project" issue was a decision for the trial judge and not the jury, stating that Rule 71 A(h)
"provides that, except for the single issue of just compensation, the trial judge is to decide all issues, legal and factual, that may be
presented." See 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d at 108.
"292 U.S. 246 (1934).
6
'1d. at 255.
6'341.45 Acres ofLand, 633 F.2d at 11l. The Olson Court cautioned: "Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations
of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded from
consideration, for that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascertainment of value - a thing to be
condemned in business transactions as well as in judicial ascertainment of truth. Olson, 292 U.S. at 257 (citations omitted).
"United States ex rel. TV.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266,281-282 (1943).
mild.
7
'Pety Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377-378. "Even where state constitutions command that compensation be made for property 'taken or
damaged' for public use, as many do, it has generally been held that that which is taken or damaged is the group of rights which the so-called
owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing, and that damage to those rights of ownership does not include losses to his business
or other consequential damage." General Motors, 323 U.S. at 380.




76For a detailed discussion of Fifth Amendment "property," see Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value. 32 B.C. L. REV.
283.
"See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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interests in the unoccupied air space
above." Swetland v. Curtiss Airports
Corporation," noted that "[in every
case in which [the Latin maxim] is to be
found it was used in connection with
occurrences common to the era, such
as overhanging branches or eaves.""
Nonetheless, as the twentieth century
began, landowners attempted to use this
theory of property ownership in an
attempt to assert their property rights
against overflights by private
individuals and the government.
To address the developing air
transportation industry and the
problems connected with the ownership
of the air above the land, the United
States passed the Air Commerce Act in
1926"' and amended it in 1938.12 Under
these statutes the United States claimed
"complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the air space" over this
country." The Acts grant any citizen
of the United States "a public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce 4
through the navigable air space of the
United States.""5 "Navigable air space"
was defined as "airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority." 6
In enacting the 1926 Act,
Congress intended to apply existing
principles of the law of water
transportation to air transportation."
Congress' regulatory power over
aviation and the public right of freedom
of travel in the navigable airspace of the
United States is analogous to, stems
from, and is subject to the same
constitutional limitations as Congress'
regulatory power over, and the public's
right to travel in the "navigable waters"
of the United States." It was upon this
premise that Congress declared the
"navigable airspace" to be a "public
highway" in the Air Commerce Act of
1926."'
In Branning," the Court of
Claims stated that while the Federal
Government's plenary power to regulate
navigable airspace is unquestionable,
the Fifth Amendment concerns are still
overriding." Just as the aquatic
navigational servitude does not afford
a blanket exemption from the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment
whenever Congress exercises its
Commerce Clause authority to regulate
navigation,92 the avigational servitude
does not preclude application of the
Taking Clause when Congress, in acting
to regulate aviation, exceeds its
reasonable power to regulate.
The landmark case to deal with
the concept of an avigation easement
under the Fifth Amendment and the
competing interests of the Civil Air
Commerce Act was United States v.
Causby.94 In Causby, the Court was
called upon to weigh the conflicting
interests (1) of the Government (and, by
implication, of others) in connection
with the need to use the air for the
passage of aircraft, and (2) of the owners
of subadjacent lands in connection with
the need for reasonable tranquility in
the airspace overhead so that they may
use and enjoy their property." On one
hand, the Court stated:
The air is a public highway, as
"Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., 14 F.Supp. 977, 981-982 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd 88 F.2d 411, 413 (C.C.A. 1987).
755 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1932).
"'Id. at 203.
149 U.S.C. §171 et seq. (repealed 1958).
9249 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (repealed 1958). For discussion of the Air Commerce Act and the Amendments, see Capt. Charles W. Gittins
USMC, Branning v. United States: The Sound of Freedom or Inverse Condemnation, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 109, 113 (1986).
"
3Causby, 328 U.S. at 260, citing 49 U.S.C. § 176(a).
"'Air Commerce" is defined as including "any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in,
interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce." 49 U.S.C. §401(3).
"49 U.S.C. §403 (repealed 1958).
"Causby, 328 U.S. at 260, citing 49 U.S.C. §180. The minimum prescribed by the regulations is 500 feet during the day and 1000 feet at
night for air carriers (Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61, §§61.7400-.740 1, Code Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., Tit. 14, Ch. 1) and from 300 to 1000 feet
for other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the character of the terrain. (Id. Pt. 60, §§60.350-.3505). Causby, at 263-264.
"'Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 97-98 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The House report accompanying the bill stated:
The provisions of the bill are not unique or unprecedented. In practically every case each provision has a precedent in an existing
provision of law, and is modeled upon and often paraphrased from it. Usually these existing provisions are those of the marine
navigation laws. This is natural for the reason that air space, with its absence of fixed roads and tracks and aircraft with their ease
of maneuver, present as to transportation practical and legal problems similar to those presented by transportation by vessels
upon the high seas. The declaration of what constitutes navigable air space is an exercise of the same source of power, the
intestate commerce clause, as that under which Congress has long declared in many acts what constitutes navigable or nonnavigable
waters. The public right of flight in the navigable air space owes its source to the same constitutional basis which, under the
decisions of the Supreme Court, has given rise to a public easement of navigation in the navigable waters of the United States,
regardless of the ownership of the adjacent or subadjacent soil. H.R.Rep. No. 572, 69th cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1926).




"Id., citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979).
"
3Id.
-328 U.S. 256 (1946). See supra notes II - 22 and accompanying text.
"Lacey v. United States, 595 F.2d 614, 615 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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Congress has declared. Were
that not true, every
transcontinental flight would
subject the operator to
countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the
idea. To recognize such
private claims to the airspace
would clog these highways,
seriously interfere with their
control and development in
the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to
which only the public has a just
claim.'
On the other hand the Court said:
[A] landowner must have
exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere if he is
to have full enjoyment of his
land and, accordingly, that a
landowner is protected against
intrusions in the airspace so
immediate and direct as to
subtract from the owner's full
enjoyment of the property and
to limit his exploitation of it."
Attempting to balance both
competing policies, Causbyestablished
the rule that flights by Government-
owned aircraft over private land are a
Fifth Amendment taking of an easement
in the overhead airspace if such flights
are so low and so frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with
the use and enjoyment of the land." The
Court indicated in Causby that the
dividing line between the portion of the
airspace in the public domain and the
portion protected as an incident of land
ownership against invasions by aircraft
was the line delineated by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (now the Federal
Aviation Administration) as the
minimum safe altitude of flight.'
It is important to note that the
land in Causby was adjacent to the
airport." The overflying airplanes were
descending toward the runway and
passed over the Causby property at a
height of approximately 83 feet, well
below the "minimum safe altitude of
flight" as prescribed by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority."" At the time
of Causby the existing laws and
regulations did not include in "navigable
airspace" the airspace required for
landing and taking off. " Congress had
defined navigable airspace only in terms
of the minimum safe altitudes of flight. "
Since the flights in Causby were well
below the limits set by Congress, the
Court did not have to deal with drawing
a dividing line between the "public
highway" and the imposition of a taking,
stating, "[wie need not determine at this
time what those precise limits are.""'
Subsequent to the decision in
Causby, as part of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958,11 Congress redefined
"navigable airspace" to mean "airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations... and shall
include airspace needed to insure safety
in takeoff and landing of aircraft."""
In dicta, Matson v. United
States"" discussed the Causby
decision. The court stated that it would
appear from Causby that flights within
the public airspace, above the 500-foot
regulated ceiling, are beyond the reach
of the landowner's objection to
interference with his property rights."
As to such use, the landowner is in the
position of abutting owners along
public highways or railroad rights-of-
way". The normal immunity to private
actions, "based upon those incidental
inconveniences that are unavoidably
attendant" upon operations, applies to
air routes allowable. 0
The Supreme Court first found
a taking where the flights were within
the navigable airspace in Griggs v.
County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania."'I
In Griggs, a property owner sued the
county for an appropriation of his
property resulting from take-off and
landing of aircraft at the county
airport.12 The Supreme Court was faced
with a situation where flights along a
glide path above the plaintiff's land,
while below 500 feet, were nevertheless
'Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
97Lacey. 595 F.2d at 615, paraphrasing Causby, 328 U.S. at 264-265.
"Id.
"Id. at 616. See supra note 86.
"Causby, 328 U.S. at 258.
1" Id.
"
12Branning, 654 F.2d at 92.
"
0Causby. 328 U.S. at 264.
'
1 Id. at 266.
"'49 U.S.C. §1301(26). This act repealed the 1926 Act and the 1938 Amendments. See supra notes 81 - 89.
""Branning, 654 F.2d at 98-99, citing 49 U.S.C. §1301(26).








within the navigable airspace as
declared by Congress in the 1958 Act."3
The Court held that a taking had
occurred despite the fact that the
landing planes were within the corridor
Congress had declared as navigable
airspace of the United States."' Te
Court reasoned: "A county that
designed and constructed a bridge
would not have a usable facility unless
it had at least an easement over the land
necessary for the approaches to the
bridge. Why should one who designs,
constructs, and uses an airport be in a
more favorable position so far as the
Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned?""
In 1963, the Court of Claims
retained the strict 500 feet public
airspace / private property demarcation
line while hinting that future cases might
arise where flights above 500 feet could
constitute a taking."6 The court found
that owners of property over which
planes flew at an elevation of less than
500 feet were entitled to compensation,
but they were not entitled to
compensation for flights above 500 feet
although they may have been
"inconvenienced to some extent by
these flights"."' In language that
served as a predecessor of cases to
come, the court noted some possible
flexibility. This is not to say that a case
could not arise where the unavoidable
damage to a person's property
occasioned by travel in the navigable
air space would be so severe as to
amount to a practical destruction or a
substantial impairment of it. When such
a case arises we would then have to
consider whether the relevant statutes
and regulations violated the property
owners' constitutional rights."' In
1981, the Court of Claims found a taking
where the overflights occurred at a
height above 500 feet."' The plaintiff,
Branning, owned land above which
United States Marine Corps aircraft
conducted operations and training.'
The training consisted of the aircraft
flying directly above Branning's
property in a "racetrack pattern" at an
altitude of 600 feet above the ground."'
The exercise resulted in a squadron of
airplanes flying "virtually nose to tail at
25 to 30 second intervals".'22 The
training was conducted over a period
of several days each month. 2 3 The
defendant, the United States, contended
the operations over Branning's property
did not constitute a taking since the
flights were above 500 feet and thus
within the public airspace.'2 4 Although
the flights were within the "public
highway" as established by Congress,
the court held that a taking occurred
because the use was particularly
burdensome to the landowner.'25 The
court stated an exception to this rule
that there can be no recovery for a taking
based upon flights within navigable
airspace.' 26 "There is a very limited
exception to the rule when the Air Force
consciously selects and imposes an
egregious burden on a plaintiff's
land."'27 The court described the effects
of the overflights as being so severe as
to amount to a practical destruction of
the land 2 '. "Since the subjacent
property owner has suffered a
diminution of the value of the property
in this case, there has been a taking of
an easement over and through the
airspace superjacent to the property of
the plaintiff."'29
The landowner in Bodine v.
United States' attempted to assert his
rights to the airspace substantially
above his land.'' Unlike previous
taking claims, Bodine alleged a taking
of airspace vastly above the limits of
private property set by Congress.3 2
"
3Branning, 654 F.2d at 98.
"
4 Id.
"sGriggs, 369 U.S. at 89-90. In most avigation easement cases, the 5th Amendment is at issue. However, Griggs invoked the 14th
Amendment because the suit was against the local government and not the federal government.
"'Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798, 801 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
"'ld. In explaining, the court stated:
It is true that the inconvenience and annoyance experienced from the passage of a plane at 501 feet above a person's property
is hardly distinguishable from that experienced from the passage of a plane at, say, 490 feet, but the extent of a right-of-way,
whether on the ground or on water or in the air has to be definitely fixed. Acts that are permissible within the limits of the right-
of-way are forbidden beyond its limits, and vice versa. Congress has fixed 500 feet as the lower limit of navigable air space;
hence, what may be permissible above 500 feet is forbidden below it, unless compensation is paid therefor.
'"Id.









' I d. at 92.
'ld. at 90.
'"Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.CL. 187, 195 (1995) (discussing the holding of Branning).
'2"Id.
"'Branning, 654 F.2d at 102.
'
29ld.






Bodine began preparations for a sky-
diving or sport parachute center from
an abandoned airstrip on a piece of
property 12.5 miles from a major Navy
airfield.' Bodine proposed to fly sky-
jumpers up to altitudes of 12,500 feet.
He sued for the taking of an avigation
easement contending that the Navy's
continuing use of the airspace above
his property constitutes the taking of
an interest in his property.'3 4 The court
found for the United States stating that
the plaintiff was attempting to impose
an easement not on the land, but upon
the air itself.' Since there was no
adverse effect on the land, the court
found the plaintiff had not suffered a
compensable taking."'
In Batten v. United States,'3 7
the Court of Appeals considered the
issue of whether a taking could occur
where the operation of jets by the
government affected the use and
enjoyment of private homes where the
aircraft did not operate directly over the
plaintiff's property.' The court held
that they could not locate any decisions
holding the United States liable for
noise, vibration, or smoke without a
physical invasion.'3 9 "Absent such
physical invasion recovery has been
uniformly denied."' 4" The court noted
that there was a distinction between a
taking and consequential damages.'
The court cited in Transportation
Company v. Chicago,4 2 where the
Supreme Court held that governmental
activities which do not directly
encroach on private property are not a
taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment even though the
consequences of such acts may impair
the use of the property.' 3 The Batten
court stated that to permit recovery for
sound and shock waves without a direct
invasion of the property owner's domain
would obliterate the carefully preserved
distinction between "damage" and
"taking"."
The Court of Claims
addressed when the taking of an
avigation easement begins in Adaman
Mutual Water Co. v. United States 45
The court held that the taking of an
avigation easement by the government
occurs when the government begins to
operate aircraft regularly and frequently
over a parcel of land at low altitudes,
with the intention of continuing such
flights indefinitely."
The Court of Claims
considered the issue of whether a
subsequent taking occurred when new
larger and noisier aircraft were
introduced into airspace previously
utilized by other aircraft in Avery v.
United States'4 7 and Hodges v. United
States. '" The court determined in both
cases that a new taking had occurred.
In Avery, the court outlined factors to
aid in determining when a further taking
has occurred. 49 Such factors include,
increased operations or the
introduction of new aircraft, either or
both of which results in greater noise,
greater inconvenience and a further
reduction of land values.'"
In Jensen v. United States"'
the Court of Claims heard the case of a
property owner alleging a taking when
the Air Force entered a nearby municipal
airport and began flying larger and
noisier airplanes than had been
previously flown there.' The court
considered two principal issues.' First,
when the taking initially occurred, and
second, the valuation of the taken
land."'
The Jensen court determined
that there is no simple litmus test for
discovering when an avigation
easement is first taken by overflights.'
Citing Causby, the court stated that
some annoyance must be borne without
compensation.' The point when that
stage is passed depends on a
particularized judgment evaluating such
factors as the frequency and level of
the flights; the type of planes; the
accompanying effects, such as noise or
falling objects; the uses of the property;










199 U.S. 635 (1878).
'Batten, 306 F.2d at 583, citing Transportation Co., 99 U.S. at 642.
'4Id. at 584.
"5181 F.Supp 658 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
'Id.
"4330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
'"355 F.2d 592 (Ct. C1. 1966).
"4330 F.2d at 643.
"Id.





Id. (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 266).
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reasonable reactions of the humans
below; and the impact upon animals and
vegetable life.7
The second issue the Jensen
court considered was the value the
landowners were entitled to for the
taking."' The measure of damages for
the taking of an easement by the
government is the difference between
the fair market value of the land just
before the easement was taken and the
fair market value of the land just after
the easement was taken.'5 9 The
plaintiffs argued that were it not for the
most recent overflights, which caused
the taking, their property would have
been ripe for residential development,
and therefore was worth considerably
more than agricultural land, its current
use."' The defendant maintained that
because of the long-standing existence
of the nearby airport, regardless of the
most recent overflights which
constituted the taking, the highest and
best use of the land was agricultural,
not residential.'"' The Commissioner
adopted the defendant's view,
conducting a fact intensive
investigation and accepting evidence
from the defendant's appraiser. '6 The
Court of Claims adopted the
Commissioner's valuation.' 6 1 The court
stated that the earlier diminution-in-
value or check on further development
and growth, linked to the existence of
the airport and its manifold activities
(which included previous overflights
which did not impose a servitude),
cannot be attributed to the later
taking.'" Although the land's use was
now effectively economically limited to
agricultural use, the court refused to
give the damages the plaintiffs had
asked for by allowing a valuation of the
property as if the landowners would
have developed it.'6 s The court instead
chose to value the easement at the
difference in value of its actual use for
the period immediately before and
immediately after the taking."
C. State Law Approach
Avigation easement and
inverse condemnation cases arise in
state court forums when suits are
brought alleging a taking under a state's
constitutional provision prohibiting a
taking without compensation.' While
the states have generally followed the
direction of the federal courts, the most
significant deviation from the federal
standards is the rejection of the
overflight requirement by a number of
states.'^^ The direct overflight, or
"invasion" requirement pronounced in
Causby and frequently applied in early
avigation easement cases, remains
significant in the states whose
constitutions are similar to the federal
constitution and allow compensation
only where there has been a "taking of
property."' 9  Other states'
constitutions require compensation not
only fora "taking" of property, but also
where property is "damaged.""' Where
this is the case, the result frequently is
the absence of the physical invasion
requirement in inverse condemnation
claims.
The Missouri Constitution
provides "[T]hat private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.""'
Missouri lacks case law directly
addressing the adoption or rejection of
the physical invasion requirement. In
Drybread v. Sr. Louis"' the Missouri
Court of Appeals permitted landowners,
whose property lay directly beneath the
flight path of aircraft ascending from
and descending to Lambert - St. Louis
International Airport, to continue
pursuing a suit for inverse
condemnation while dismissing the
counts for recovery under theories of




'"Federal Real Estate and Storage Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 667, 682 (1934).







"'See Pamela B. Stein, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation in Airport Growth. 57 1. AIR L. & Com. 513, 529-36 (1991).
'"See Zitter, supra, note 22. Jurisdictions which do not require direct physical invasion (overflights) of property include: California -
Aaron v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471 (Cal. App. 1974); Florida - Jacksonville v. Schumann 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964),
Jacksonville v. Schumann, 199 So.2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Oklahoma - Henthom v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 10 13 (Okla. 1969);
Oregon -Thronburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962), Thomburg v. Port of Portland, 415 P.2d 750 (Or. 1966); Pennsylvania
- Philadelphia v. Keyser, 407 A.2d 55 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); Tennessee -Johnson v. Greenville, 435 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1968), Jackson
v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, 922 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn. 1996); Washington - Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash.
1964).
"Stein, supra note 167, at 530.
'mid. at 533. Includes: Washington, California and Missouri.
"'Id.
172Mo. CozSs. art. I, § 10.




cited Causby and stated that "relief, if
any, for the permanent nuisance lies in
their inverse condemnation count." 75
The Oregon Supreme Court's
decisions in the Thornburg"6 cases are
the leading state deviations from federal
law in the area of airport inverse
condemnation.'" The facts of
Thornburg were similar to the Tenth
Circuit case of Batten v. United
States,7 1 in that the plaintiff's lived near
an airport, but not directly under the
flight path of the airplanes. While the
Tenth Circuit did not find a taking in
Batten because of lack of direct
overflight, the Oregon Supreme Court
in Thornburg found a taking under the
Oregon constitution. The court began
by accepting that noise can be a legal
nuisance which, if loud enough or
continuous enough, can ripen into an
easement."' The court continued by
reasoning that "[a] nuisance can be
such an invasion of the rights of the
possessor as to amount to a taking, in
theory at least, any time a possessor is
in fact ousted from the enjoyment of his
land.""
Thornburg became the first
case to hold that a compensable
trespassory taking could involve noise
interference from beside a property
rather than only directly above it.'"' The
court stated that "[t]he real question was
not one of perpendicular extension of
surface boundaries into the airspace,
but a question of reasonableness based
upon nuisance theories.""'
The Thornburg decisions were
the first deviation by a state from the
taking theory put forth in Causby.*
The result of the Thornburg decisions
was shift of "the focus of the judicial
inquiry from the location of the source
of the interference to the actual damage
caused by the interference.""' A
number of state courts have since
followed the rationale of Thornburg. "
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The court began its analysis
of Brown v. United States'6 by stating
the general proposition that if the
government physically occupies
privately owned land over the owner's
objections, the government is liable.'"
The court stated that regardless of the
extent of intrusion, and no matter how
weighty the public purpose,
compensation is required." Because
of this, the court noted that the extent
of occupation is only relevant to
compensation, not liability."'"
The Court of Appeals next
stated that under common law, the owner
of real property was considered to own
from the center of the earth to the top of
the sky.'" Historically, anytime the
government occupied privately owned
land for public use over the owner's
objection, a taking had arisen under the
Fifth Amendment which required
compensation."' Because of the
necessity of modern aviation an
invasion of the airspace above surface
land does not per se constitute a
taking.'92 However, under Causby and
its progeny, once the surface owner
proves that low-level overflights result
in direct, immediate, and substantial
interference with the enjoyment and use
of the property, the owner establishes a
taking for which the Constitution
mandates just compensation. 9 3
Next, the court discussed the
trial court's finding that because the
Browns current use of the affected
property for cattle ranching and
recreation, and their income from these
activities, have not diminished, the
Browns cannot have suffered a
substantial interference with their
enjoyment and use of their land under
Causby."^' The government argued that
Causby does not protect against a
decrease in market value when that
'"Id. at 521.
"'The first case was Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962). Following a remand, the Supreme Court of Oregon heard
another appeal of the same case, Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 415 P.2d 750 (Or. 1966).
"Richard Kahn,Inverse Condemnation and the Highway Cases: Compensation for Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C. ENVrTL. AFF. L. REv. 563
(1995).
'See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
'"Kahn, supra note 177, at 578-579, citing Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 102.
"Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 105.
"'Stein, supra note 167 at 532.
12Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 107.
"'Kahn, supra note 177, at 580, citing William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect,
71 DICK. L. REv. 207, 209 (1967).
1"Id.
"'Stein, supra note 167, at 532. The states include Washington, Florida and most recently a 1996 Tennessee Supreme Court decision,













decrease is not accompanied by
diminishment of present, actual use of
the property.' The instant court
reversed the trial court stating, that the
government's view that interference
with "enjoyment and use""' means
interference with present use as an
indispensable requisite for a successful
takings claim based on noise from
overflights, deprives the term
"enjoyment" of its classical meaning in
property law, and makes the phrase
"enjoyment and use" redundant.197
Further, the court stated that property
owners clearly enjoy not only the right
to put their land to a particular present
use, but also to hold the land for
investment and appreciation, and to
lease or convey the land to others,
gratuitously or for profit.'
The court focused on the issue
of present use vs. future development.
Declaring that an important element in a
property owner's bundle of rights is the
right to economically exploit the land,
or the right to sell the land for the best
price available in the market, based not
only on its current use but on potential
other uses for which the market is
prepared to pay." Therefore, the court
concluded that to the extent that
frequent and low overflights, through
noise, vibrations, fumes, and so forth,
have directly and substantially impaired
the use of the Brown's property for
recreational ranching or other uses "to
which the land could readily be
converted," there has been a substantial
interference with the enjoyment of the
property.2 ') Significant and immediate
decline in market price which is directly
attributable to overflights, would
suggest such an interference.20
The court criticized the
government's view that compensation
should be paid only if the overflights
interfere with the land's current use202.
The court voiced its concern by
explaining that under the government's
view, the government would be able to
make uncompensated use of private
property if that use did not immediately
interfere with the landowner's current
use.2"3 This reasoning would preclude
takings on land held for investment
purposes or for future use.2"4 The
government, the court explained, could
effectively preclude future lawful uses
of the property without compensation
to the owner, simply by making such
uses undesirable or unprofitable. 2 5
"The Fifth Amendment does not permit
the Government to destroy individual
rights in that manner. "206
Finally, the court concluded its
analysis by stating that the affidavits
submitted by the Browns are sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the issue of damages from
the overflights. 207 The court remanded
the issue of damages to the trial court.21
In remanding, the court directed the trial
court to consider the following factors:
(1) the existence of the market for the
proposed future use the plaintiff
advocates, (2) the inclusion of this
property in that market, (3) the amount
of noise created by the overflights, and
(4) how the noise decreases the market
value of this property within that
market.2W
V. COMMENT
The decision in Brown is
important because it is the first case in
the realm of avigation easements to
define the term "enjoyment and use" to
include damages resulting from a
decrease in fair market value of the land
for other uses to which the land could
readily be converted.2 1 ' The
implications of this decision are far-
reaching. Other decisions have stated
that future uses of land are a
consideration,2"' yet none have gone so
far as to hold that mere ideas or concepts
of desired future uses for the land are a
consideration when analyzing the taking
claim. 212  After Brown, aircraft
overflights do not have to cause
immediate diminishment of present,
actual use of the property.213 Hereafter,
'1The term "enjoyment and use" is from Causby, where to constitute a taking, the overflights must cause direct, immediate, and substantial
interference with the enjoyment and use of the property. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.













210See supra notes 198 - 206 and accompanying text.
"..Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. In Causby, the court stated that the normal measure of recovery, "may reflect the use to which the land could
readily be converted, as well as the existing use."
221d. at 262. The court defined the property owner's beneficial ownership of the land as the owner's right to possess and exploit the land.
In Mid-States Fais and Oils Corp. v. United States 159 Ct. Cl. 301 (1962), the Court of Claims found a taking by overflight when low,
frequent and noisy overflights interfered with property that the owner was in the process of preparing for future use as a soybean
processing plant.
"'See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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low and frequent over-flights which
impair uses to which the land could be
readily converted are sufficient to find
a Fifth Amendment taking 14
Brown's contribution to the
status of avigation easements is
significant to avoid property holders
from being caught in a catch-22 between
an absence of diminishment of present,
actual use of the property and the six
year statute of limitations. If the court
would have decided for the government,
finding that there must be an impairment
of present, actual use of the property,
the property holder who is not
immediately suffering from the
overflights would not have an action
for taking until he changes the nature
of the property such that the flights are
actually impairing the use of the
property. The six year statute of
limitations for avigation easement claims
begins tolling from either the time of the
first flights which cause the taking, or
from the time of substantially increased
use such that a new taking arises.' If
the landowner does not suffer an actual
loss within this six year period, he is
forever precluded by the statute of
limitations from seeking compensation
for the taking.
For instance, in Brown, the
first flights which caused the avigation
easement arose in January, 1991 ?" The
statute of limitations began tolling then,
such that any cause of action for taking
would have to be brought by January,
1997. The Browns, however, were able
to continue using their land for raising
cattle and hunting and did not suffer
any decrease in revenue because of the
overflights.' If the Brown court would
have held otherwise, and would have
allowed a taking only where the
plaintiffs had shown substantial
interference with their present
enjoyment and use, the Browns would
have immediately been without a cause
of action for taking since there was no
interference with their present
enjoyment and use, yet the statute of
limitations for an action would still run.
The Browns would have needed to
develop their land into an endeavor only
to have the value of which be diminished
before the deadline of January, 1997, if
they were ever to have a cause of action
not barred by the statute of limitations.
While the Court of Claim's
holding in Brown is breaking new
ground in the area of avigation
easements, it is actually little more than
the logical extension of the traditional
compensation theory for Fifth
Amendment Takings."' The Supreme
Court has long held that in takings
cases, land is to be valued at the highest
and best use."' In fact, the first Supreme
Court case to discuss avigation
easements, Causby, set the basis for
Brown in noting that in determining the
value of the taking, the value "may
reflect the use to which the land could
readily be converted, as well as the
existing use."22
In an effort to prevent
speculation and conjecture of what
actually entails the highest and best use,
the Court has historically directed that
the proposed use must be reasonably
probable, the property must be
adaptable for these uses, and there is
actually a demand, currently, or in the
near future, for the proposed uses.2 1
In a similar fashion, in remanding the
case for consideration, the Brown court
directed the trial court to consider,
among other things, the existence of a
market for the proposed use of the
Brown's ranch, and the inclusion of the
ranch in that market.m Just as the
traditional restrictions serve to ensure
a fair and adequate valuation of the
highest and best use, the
considerations directed by the Brown
court serve the same purpose.
One criticism of the Brown
decision is that in accepting a market
value compensation method which
includes potential future uses, the court
has opened the proverbial pandora's
box for future trial courts. Critics claim
situations similar to the Brown's will
develop where the landowner will file
suit even though the income from the
property will remain unchanged and
current uses are unaffected. The
emphasis on market value will lead to a
costly and confusing battle of expert
witnesses, as each side presents
numerous real estate appraisals and
market studies to demonstrate the
impact of aircraft noise on property
values."'
This concern, although
possibly somewhat exaggerated, may be
well-founded. Nonetheless, identical
concerns are present in regard to market
valuation of other inverse
condemnation cases. The law in this
area is solidly established in traditional
inverse condemnation cases. Extension
of this valuation method to avigation
easement cases will not alter the
concept. The concern, although with
merit, is absent any legal foundation in
light of the great weight of authority
holding otherwise.
214 d.
21 See supra notes 148 - 150 and accompanying text.
2t See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
2
"See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 54 - 75 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 65 - 67 and accompanying text.
m1Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
'See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
22 2Brown, 73 F.3d at I105. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.




The Supreme Court's finding
of a taking in Causby was the first
extension of inverse condemnation
principles to the airspace through an
avigation easement.224 Over the past
fifty years, the courts have looked to
traditional inverse condemnation
principles for direction on how to
proceed with issues. The Court of
Claim's approach in Brown is no
different. The decision of the court to
allow a property holder to assert
damages as to the impact on the market
value is simply a logical extension from
traditional inverse condemnation law.
The policy behind the takings clause is
to prevent the imposition of an
inordinate burden upon a few for the
public benefit.225 By requiring just
compensation, the owner is to be made
whole by putting him in the same
pecuniary position as if his property had
not been taken. 26 By permitting those
burdened with an avigation easement
to seek damages for potential future
uses, the court's actions are consistent
with this policy.
22 See supra notes 94 - 104 and accompanying text.
2
'See Stein, supra note 167, at 529.
m'See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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